Managing Uncertainty in Organic Development Projects by Mathiassen, Lars & Pedersen, Keld
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 23 Article 27
11-2008
Managing Uncertainty in Organic Development
Projects
Lars Mathiassen
Georgia State University, lmathiassen@gsu.edu
Keld Pedersen
Aalborg University, Denmark
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Mathiassen, Lars and Pedersen, Keld (2008) "Managing Uncertainty in Organic Development Projects," Communications of the





Volume 23 Article 27 
Managing Uncertainty in Organic Development Projects  
Lars Mathiassen 
 
Centre for Process Innovation, 






Aalborg University, Denmark 
 
A variety of organic models for systems development have been recommended for more than three decades. These 
models rest on the assumption that the uncertainty is high and additional team capabilities have to be developed 
during the project life-cycle. In contrast to the single-pass and document-driven waterfall model, organic models 
impose less rigid structure on the process, and they are geared toward exploration. We know little, however, about 
how uncertainties are managed over the life-cycle of organic systems development projects.  
 
In response to this challenge, we adapt task uncertainty theory to conduct a qualitative study of management 
practices in a project based on two-phase funding, staged delivery, and a combination of prototyping and 
specifications. We provide detailed narratives of how uncertainties emerged, interacted, and were addressed in the 
project. The subsequent analyses suggest that the adopted organic model facilitated management of uncertainty, 
but it also introduced surprising and demanding management challenges that were not accounted for in the model.  
 
The study adds to our understanding of management practices in organic systems development. It shows how 
combinations of offensive and defensive responses can help managers address the uncertainties they face. In 
addition, managers are advised to differentiate between developing know-what and know-how capabilities and to 
dynamically adapt their uncertainty response mode to fit a project’s evolving context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The waterfall model [Royce 1970] offers detailed guidelines for how to structure the development process, distribute 
tasks, monitor progress, assure quality, and integrate solutions. While the waterfall model is a powerful sense-
making device and provides easy-to-follow support for project management, it assumes the task is well structured 
and team capabilities fit the task [McFarlan 1981; Mathiassen and Stage 1992]. These assumptions are seldom met 
in practice because it is difficult to specify and stabilize requirements early, because developers might have 
insufficient experience with technology, and, because the complexity might exceed developer experiences 
[McFarlan 1981].  
 
Thought leaders of our profession have therefore for more than three decades promoted a variety of organic models 
based on iteration, prototyping, two-phase funding, staged delivery, and agile principles [e.g., Basili and Turner 
1975; Boehm 1988; McConnell 1998; Cockburn and Highsmith 2001; Larman and Basili 2003]. These models 
assume the task uncertainty [Galbraith 1973] is high and additional team capabilities have to be developed during 
the project life-cycle [McFarlan 1981; Mathiassen and Stage 1992]. In contrast to the single-pass and document-
driven waterfall model [Larman and Basili 2003], organic models impose less rigid structure on the process and they 
are geared towards exploration. As a consequence, projects are more unpredictable and require considerable 
project management attention. However, we know little about how to manage uncertainties in organic development 
projects.  
 
The purpose of this research is therefore to investigate project management practices in organic systems 
development. To that end we adapt theories about task uncertainty [Galbraith 1973; Iivari 1992] to conduct a 
qualitative study of a project based on two-phase funding, staged delivery, and a combination of prototyping and 
specifications [McConnell 1998]. Inspired by the classical notion of task uncertainty - “the difference between the 
amount of information required to perform the task and the information already possessed” [Galbraith 1973, p. 5] - 
we present in-depth analyses of how uncertainties emerged, interacted, and were addressed. Our analyses suggest 
that the adopted organic model facilitated management of uncertainty, but it also introduced surprising and 
demanding management challenges that were not accounted for.  
 
The study adds to our understanding of organic development projects and suggests tactics for their management. In 
the following, we present the background literature and describe our research approach. We then provide two 
detailed narratives of the investigated project. Subsequently, we adapt task uncertainty theory to make sense of the 
data. Finally, we discuss the contribution and implications for research and practice. 
II. ORGANIC SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
A fundamental reason for adopting organic models in systems development is high task uncertainty [Galbraith 1973; 
Mathiassen and Stage 1992]. McFarlan [1981] distinguishes between three general types of systems development 
uncertainty, the first being a project’s conception of the problem and its solution. Requirements are often hard to 
define, communicate, and validate and once they are specified and agreed upon they often change [e.g. Naumann 
and Jenkins 1982; Gould and Lewis 1985; Curtis et al. 1988; Rising and Janoff 2000; Orr 2004; Sarkkinen and 
Karsten 2005; Turk et al. 2005]. As a consequence, most researchers promote prototyping, iterative models, or agile 
approaches to quickly deliver partial solutions to customers in order to support feed-back and progress [e.g. 
Naumann and Jenkins 1982; Beck 1999; Turk et al. 2005].  
 
A second type of uncertainty relates to a project’s experience with technology; these increase as the project’s 
familiarity with the technical platform decreases [McFarlan 1981]. Brooks [1975] states that we must be prepared to 
throw away the first version and build and deliver a second whenever we use a new concept or rely on new 
technology. Organic models typically reduce these uncertainties by allowing early use [Parnas and Clements 1986] 
and by providing information about team productivity acquired in previous steps [Lott 1997].  
 
A third type of uncertainty relates to a project’s complexity [McFarlan 1981]. Brooks [1987] argue that it is impossible 
to build complex systems faultlessly, and it is therefore advisable to iterate or adopt staged delivery. Sotirovski 
[2001] adds that if we are going to fail it is better to do it fast and in small scale. Parnas and Clements [1986] argue 
human errors are unavoidable and even when all information is available up-front, we cannot fully comprehend it. 
Generally, we can manage complexity by separating concerns and by using stepwise refinement [Wirth 1971]. 
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To address these types of uncertainties, the literature discusses a variety of organic models. There is prototyping 
where the basic idea is to present a series of mock-ups or draft versions to users and improve the design based on 
their feed-back [Baskerville and Stage 1996]. There is structured use of documentation to gradually build and adjust 
specifications [Parnas and Clements 1986]. There is the spiral model that combines risk management with a cyclic 
approach to problem identification, experimentation, and documentation [Boehm 1988]. There is the combination of 
two-phase funding and staged-delivery that allow for contractual adjustments and stepwise delivery of a solution 
[McConnel 1998]. There is extreme programming that includes the use of on-site customers, minimal 
documentation, pair programming, and continuous integration of new components [Beck 1999]. There is the recent 
focus on agile methods [Cockburn and Highsmith 2001; Orr 2004; Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004; Boehm and 
Turner 2004; Turk et al. 2005]. Finally, there is the inclusion of iteration as a key tactic in development methods [e.g. 
Jacobsen et al. 1999]. 
 
While organic models allow project teams to develop additional capabilities in response to high task uncertainty, the 
literature also suggests that they imply a number of challenges. First, managers must structure the process and 
combine use of prototypes and specifications [Boehm et al. 1984; Boehm 1988; Mathiassen and Stage 1992; 
Mathiassen et al. 1995; Sotirovski 2001]. Alavi and Wetherbe [1991] found that if prototyping was preceded by a 
systematic analysis, fewer iterations were needed and more efficient solutions were achieved, but at the cost of 
making the process more complicated and stressful. Second, organic projects must manage contracts and distribute 
economic risks in a way that is acceptable for both customers and vendors [Boehm 1988]. Third, they must facilitate 
exploration, but at the same time ensure convergence. Chillarege suggests that an agile approach that allows for 
fast feedback from the market is best in the early stages while predictability and control are more important in later 
stages [2002]. This is well in line with the spiral model [Boehm 1988]. Fourth, managers must design iterations to fit 
the particular project. Several authors suggest limiting the duration of iterations, except the first, to a few weeks 
[Beck 1999; Rising and Janoff 2000; Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004] and also and placing the most valuable and 
important functionality in the first iteration. The rationale is to make sure that customers get the important 
requirements satisfied even if the project runs out of money or gets delayed [Beck 1999]. Sotirovski adds that 
systems mature over time, and better quality is achieved by building the most critical parts first [2001]. Organic 
projects must finally recurrently manage agreements between stakeholders [Sarkkinen and Karsten 2005], emerging 
interactions between developers and users [Gallivan and Keil 2003], make decisions between alternative options, 
and measure progress and nearness-to-completion [Baskerville and Stage 1996].  
 
Key solutions to address these challenges include: cycles that combine prototypes and specifications [Boehm 1988], 
two-phase funding to allow for contractual flexibility [McConnel 1998], risk management [Boehm 1988; Mathiassen 
et al. 1995], faking of a rational design process [Parnas and Clements 1986], risk analysis to control prototyping 
[Baskerville and Stage 1996], staged delivery of solutions [McConnel 1998], and balancing agility with disciplined 
approaches [Boehm and Turner 2004]. 
 
Organic models are, in summary, motivated by different types of uncertainty and there is a portfolio of supporting 
techniques available that allow project teams to develop additional capability. While there are definite challenges 
involved in managing organic development projects, there are no studies of how uncertainties emerge and are 
addressed over the life-cycle of organic projects. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL TASK UNCERTAINTY 
There is a long tradition for adopting information processing as an integrating concept in studying organizational 
practices [e.g., Burns and Stalker 1961; Tushman and Nadler 1978; Gresov 1989; Goodhue and Thompson 1995]. 
The basic approach is to study how information processing requirements can be linked to information processing 
options to obtain a satisfactory fit [Iivari 1992].  
 
Galbraith’s classical theory [1973] suggests that bureaucratic organizations, with hierarchical structures, centralized 
control, and standard operating procedures, in general are the most efficient in processing information. A 
bureaucratic organization relies, however, on the assumption that the task uncertainty is low so the information it 
needs to process outside its pre-programmed procedures is minimal. As the task uncertainty increases, the 
hierarchy becomes overloaded with ad-hoc information processing requests and the organization must be modified 
choosing from among four strategies [Galbraith 1973; Van de Ven and Drazin 1985]. Two of these, creation of slack 
resources and creation of self-contained units, reduce internal interdependencies and the need to process additional 
information, while two other strategies, investment in vertical information systems and creation of lateral relations, 
offer mechanisms to process more information. In the extreme case with high task uncertainty, organizations 
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Galbraith’s theory [1973] provides a useful foundation for studying uncertainty in systems development for a number 
of reasons. First, there is a strong analogy between Galbraith’s understanding of organic organization as a response 
to increased uncertainty in bureaucratic organizations, and organic development as a response to the limitations of 
the waterfall model. Second, uncertainty has played and continues to play a key role in studying systems 
development [e.g. Alter and Ginzberg 1978; McFarlan 1981; Rai and Al-Hindi 2000; Turk et al. 2005]. Third, applying 
the task-uncertainty lens led us to practically relevant and theoretically interesting insights. 
 
In the following, we adapt Galbraith’s concepts to systems development projects as follows. Uncertainty is, at any 
point in time, understood as the difference between the capabilities required to successfully execute the project and 
the capabilities currently possessed by the project. As a consequence, projects can address the uncertainties they 
face either by reducing the additional capabilities required or by increasing their current capabilities.  
IV. RESEARCH APPROACH 
On this background, we organized an exploratory, interpretive case study [Yin 1994; Walsham 1995, 2006] of an 
outsourced government development project in a Scandinavian firm, SoftConsult, to address two research 
questions: 
 
1. How do uncertainties emerge and interact over the life-cycle of an organic development project?  
2. How does an organic development project respond to uncertainties over its life-cycle?  
 
The research was conducted in close collaboration between the two authors [Mathiassen 2002]. One author was 
project manager of the studied project and the other is systems development researcher. One authors’ participation 
in the project gave access to data that are normally very difficult to obtain. Relying on several data sources 
supported triangulation and helped establish a valid basis for analysis [Yin 1994]. Data about events, activities, and 
decisions were systematically collected based on the project manager’s participation and unlimited access to the 
project’s complete set of documentation, products, and measurement data. Additional data were collected using 
estimates, time used on individual program modules, errors found, change requests, and changes in plans that were 
collected during the project. Productivity data from the staged delivery phase were used to analyze the impact of 
iteration based on learning curves [Epple et al. 1991; Lapre et al. 2000]. Productivity was defined as the number of 
hours used to program and unit test a system function. Also, to compare across functions, we categorized them as 
simple, medium, or complex based on function points [Jones 1991] and inter-subjective evaluations by team 
members.  
 
We adopted a combination of narratives and alternate template analysis to make sense of the data [Langley 1999]. 
The advantage of narratives is that they provide rich and detailed account of events, activities, and decisions as an 
important part of the research contribution [Langley 1999]. The disadvantage is that authors are likely to suffer from 
bias. The narrative was therefore developed iteratively as a joint tale [Van Maanen 1988] between the two authors; 
also, key project members and colleagues critically reviewed the narrative and subsequent corrections were 
implemented. The narratives were developed by asking for each project phase: Which uncertainties emerged? What 
impact did the uncertainties have? How were uncertainties addressed? What were the conditions for addressing 
uncertainties? 
 
Alternate template analysis offers interpretations based on different, but internally coherent theoretical lenses. While 
narratives are basically inductive drawing primarily on raw data, the alternate template approach is primarily 
deductive drawing on theory [Langley 1999]. Our interpretations were based on Galbraith’s theory [1973] and 
benefited from two lenses focusing on uncertainty dynamics (i.e. research question 1) and organic responses (i.e. 
research question 2). 
V. INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT 
The project was conducted by SoftConsult, a large Scandinavian supplier of IT-based solutions, on behalf of a 
Danish government agency. SoftConsult operates in a dynamic and complex environment and each delivered 
solution tends to be unique. The company engages highly trained experts that are deployed to work in multi-
disciplinary teams. Projects share resources and a basic quality assurance system, but they are based on different 
technologies and relate to a great variety of customers. Projects are typically designed with customers and the 
technical architecture is designed to conform to their preferences. The company’s core asset is its ability to run 
medium to large projects, more than knowledge about specific application areas and technologies. The company 
operates at different locations, and projects are occasionally staffed across locations. Whenever new technologies 
or applications are in demand, SoftConsult develops the necessary skills as an integral part of a customer contract. 
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The project took place from February 2000 to October 2001. The effort was approximately 17,000 man-hours and 
the system covered 3,200 function points. The project manager adopted an organic model composed of two-phase 
funding, staged delivery, and a combination of prototyping and specifications [McConnell 1998]. Project 
management was heavily inspired by state-of-the-art literature [McConnell 1998; Humphrey 1989]. During project 
start up, Capability Maturity Model level 2 processes [Humphrey 1989] were defined and established except for 
subcontract management. Analysis and overall design followed an object oriented method [Mathiassen et al. 2001] 
and user interface prototyping of the complete interface [McConnell 1998]. During staged delivery, the first three out 
of four deliveries were released to user test, not for production. The overall intention was to ensure adequacy of the 
design compared to user needs and to foster learning so that experiences from one phase could improve the system 
and processes in the next phase [McConnell 1998]. The project was reasonably successful. Compared to the 
original schedule it was one month late, but the delivered system included more functionality than originally agreed 
upon. The major phases were: 
 
1. Getting in position (01/11/99-14/02/00): Invested in initial explorations to make a better bid  
2. Preparing the bid (14/02/00-06/04/00): Developed proposal based on stated system requirements 
3. Negotiating contract (06/04/00-01/06/00): Presented project proposal to customer and negotiated 
contract 
4. Project planning (02/05/00-07/06/00: Detailed processes, a project organization, and technical 
infrastructure put in place 
5. Analysis and design (22/05/00-09/10/00): Requirements analyzed, system designed, and development 
of technical architecture initiated  
6. Staged delivery (23/10/00-20/08/01): Detailed design, construction, and test performed through four 
stages of delivery 
 
Approximately 1,000 hours were spent on preparation and sales (01.01.2000-01.05.2000), approximately 2,600 
hours on project management, education, and development of technical infrastructure, and 2,500 hours on 
installation, pilot tests, and handling of errors found during the first year after customer approval. Key data, including 
earned value [Fleming and Koppelman 2000], are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Project Phases 
Activity People Hours Deviation Earned value 
Project planning 5 450 -7% 2.8 
Analysis & design 7 2,530 +14% 15.8 
Stage 1 7 1,480 +18% 7.8 
Stage 2 11 2,930 +10% 18.3 
Stage 3 11 2,550 +3% 16.5 
Stage 4 9 1,680 +27% 7.6 
VI. NARRATIVES 
In the following, we present two project narratives [Van Maanen 1988; Langley 1999]. The first focuses on how 
uncertainties emerged, interacted, and were addressed; the second focuses on how the adopted organic model 
impacted uncertainties during the project. The uncertainties are defined in Table 2 and the Appendix provides a 
summary of how they were addressed during the different stages of the project. 
Uncertainty Dynamics 
Getting in Position 
SoftConsult knew that a major development project, to be outsourced by a government agency, was underway. The 
project would generate business for many years to come, the customer was already buying other services from 
SoftConsult, and the company believed it could win the contract. At the same time, the would-be project manager 
was between projects and was given time to prepare for the project. The project manager was at this point the only 
person engaged in the project. His initial strategy was exploratory because there was little information available. He 
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The project manager addressed system requirements (#1) by seeking relevant information from colleagues that 
knew the government agency and by studying publicly available reports on the agency’s strategy. He identified two 
alternative technical solutions (#2), a Web-based and a three-tier client server architecture. The project manager 
also started to address the development strategy (#8). The government agency preferred the waterfall model. 
However, the project faced many uncertainties and the project manager believed the agency would accept an 
organic approach if properly presented. 
 
Table 2. Uncertainties 
# Uncertainty Type Concern 
1 System requirements Product What are the customer’s requirements? 
2 Technical solution Product What technical solution is appropriate? 
3 Change implications Product What are the implications of requirements changes? 
4 User interface Product How will users respond to the interface?  
5 Design conformance Product Does the design meet the requirements? 
6 Implementation strategy Product How can we implement the design? 
7 System quality Product Is the quality satisfactory? 
8 Development strategy Process What strategy fits this project? 
9 Developer capability Process What is the capability of each developer? 
10 Process improvement Process How can we improve during execution? 
11 Competition Process What is the competition for the contract? 
12 Customer economy Process How big is the customer’s project budget? 
13 Development cost Process What are the development costs? 
14 Development process Process How can we get the job done? 
15 Project status Process How are we doing? 
 
An organic approach would allow developers to learn through traditional analysis and design activities and at the 
same time provide user feedback from prototypes and versions of the system [Mathiassen et al. 2001]. Two-phase 
funding would further facilitate early adjustment of commitments and expectations and releasing often and early 
through staged-delivery would also provide valuable information [McConnell 1998]. Second, an organic approach 
would help develop important team capabilities. Two-phase funding would help tailor the project to the situation and 
staged delivery would allow ”end-of-stage wrap-ups” [McConnell 1998] to improve team capabilities in subsequent 
stages. 
 
The project manager addressed developer capability (#9) by collecting quantitative data from similar projects to 
support estimation, by committing selected colleagues to participate in the project, and by continuing to select 
process models and solutions from within SoftConsult. Finally, at this stage, the project manager started to identify 
tactics for implementing process improvements (#10) based on the staged delivery approach [McConnell 1998; 
Humphrey 1989]. He hoped in this way to allow learning to influence planning and management as the project 
unfolded. 
 
These responses were constrained by several factors. Legislation aimed to secure fair and open competition and 
made it difficult to acquire customer information or take part in the customer’s requirements elicitation. Such 
involvement would disqualify SoftConsult from participating in the bid. Also, technical decisions were not only 
focused on creating ideal solutions. Choice of technology had implications for where in SoftConsult the project would 
be placed, which people would be involved, and what career possibilities would open after project completion. 
Finally, quite limited resources were available because it was still unclear whether SoftConsult would get the 
contract. Solutions were therefore sketchy. Despite these limitations, the project manager succeeded to lay the 
foundation for an organic approach with improvements at each stage of delivery. 
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Preparing Bid 
The bidding was regulated by legislation. There were six weeks for preparation and customer communication had to 
follow strict procedures. During this process an ad-hoc team, including the project manager, sales people, 
managers, and future team members analyzed 400 pages of requirements. These activities involved designing the 
process, preparing questions to the customer, analyzing prizing and competition issues, producing an overall design 
of a solution, developing a budget, conducting internal quality reviews, and finally producing and delivering the bid. 
The strategy was to balance between a solution the customer would prefer and one based on existing capabilities 
within SoftConsult. In addition, the adoption of two-phase funding split the project. The first step would lead to a 
detailed specification of the system. The specification was subsequently to be agreed upon by the customer. This 
would then form the basis for contracting the second phase based on staged delivery.  
 
The ad-hoc team addressed system requirements (#1) through systematic studies of stated requirements, by 
consulting application domain experts within SoftConsult, and by addressing vague and conflicting requirements in 
the bid. Technical solutions (#2) were developed with internal experts on hardware, software, network technologies, 
and security. Also, it was decided to adopt the three-tier client server architecture building on previous projects. 
Finally, detailed technical decisions were postponed whenever feasible. Potential competition (#11) and the 
customer’s budget (#12) played important roles at this stage. The team addressed these uncertainties through 
informal sources. The competition was considered moderate and the customer’s budget sufficient to develop a 
satisfactory bid. The final development cost (#13) was based on function point counts, budgets from similar projects, 
and risk and stakeholder analyses. Slack was build into the analysis and design phase because of outstanding 
requirements. Some highly uncertain requirements were also separated out based on an hourly rate rather than 
fixed price. The rationale for the overall development strategy and a detailed description of the process (#14) was 
included in the bid.  
 
Uncertainty responses during this phase were severely restricted by the short time period and limited opportunities 
to interact with the customer. Customer requirements were very detailed and badly structured and the customer 
wanted to extend contract coverage while the competition was still on. There was also internal rivalry between 
departments at SoftConsult. A satisfactory outcome was achieved despite these conditions. The combination of 
partially reduced requirements, a technical solution based on previous experience, the adoption of an organic 
approach, and a budget based on systematic estimates created a satisfactory basis for the project. Uncertainties 
related to competition and customer budget were never completely resolved; but they became irrelevant after this 
phase. The team knew the adoption of the traditional architecture resulted in strong developer capabilities, but it also 
created a new uncertainty: would the solution meet customer requirements? 
Negotiating Contract 
Different vendors presented their proposals and the customer decided to initiate negotiations with SoftConsult. 
Uncertainties were addressed by the ad-hoc team of people, now including SoftConsult’s legal advisor. The team’s 
strategy was conservative. It strongly favoured current team capabilities over exploring new opportunities. In some 
areas both parties wanted to reduce uncertainties (e.g. creating a common understanding of vague requirements), in 
other areas (e.g. changes because of releases from Microsoft, IBM, or Oracle) negotiations distributed economic 
risks in a way acceptable for both parties. The customer tried to improve the solution and the vendor tried to 
minimize implementation risks. 
 
The technical solution uncertainty (#2) was dramatically simplified by adopting the three-tier architecture. Emerging 
requirements were difficult to assess (#3). The team generally refused to guarantee implied changes from operating 
systems, office packages, and database systems. Instead, additional analysis and design activities were included 
into the first phase of funding. The development process (#14) was discussed in detail so the customer was 
committed to the organic approach. It was agreed that the customer should develop the online help and all user-
documentation based on guidelines from SoftConsult. 
 
It was difficult for the ad-hoc team to openly acknowledge major uncertainties in front of the customer, especially on 
issues where the customer expected SoftConsult to be expert. There was limited time available and the customer 
was eager to avoid any responsibility for possible failures. The project continued to converge despite these 
limitations. It was, however, still quite uncertain whether team capabilities would align with the contract and whether 
the technical solution would satisfy customer requirements. 
Project Planning 
To meet deadlines, the planning process started before the contract was signed. The goal was to create appropriate 
conditions before development started. Detailed plans were made, the project organization defined, and process and 
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[Humphrey 1989] were established except for subcontract management. Commitments to plans were created 
through meetings and reviews between the project team and customer representatives. Finally, an official kick-off 
seminar was conducted to give customer representatives and team members a possibility to build relations and 
debate the project. Requirements were at this point clarified and detailed by the project manager, the project team, 
customer representatives, and the steering committee. The strategy was to systematically define processes to 
support project tracking and oversight and to allow new insights to influence the project. 
 
Customer requirements issues (#1) were addressed by allocating expert users to the project and through reviews 
conducted with customer representatives. The expert users had worked in the customer organization for many 
years, they knew relevant work tasks, and they were highly regarded by co-workers. User interface design (#4) was 
simplified by developing a standard and by having it approved across relevant user communities. The customer 
found this important because other projects had experienced problems getting users to agree on interface issues. 
The development process (#14) was further detailed in close collaboration with the customer, in particular analysis, 
design, and project management. Developer capability (#9) was enhanced by forming the project team, by training 
team members in the adopted analysis and design methods, and by assigning individual responsibilities to all team 
members. 
 
Customer requirements were constantly addressed. Uncertainties were reduced on specific issues, but also 
increased due to changed conditions. The uncertainty of development costs was still substantial even though the 
project team was formed and the task was better understood. The project manager knew little about individual 
developer capabilities. The team included people new to SoftConsult, without formal systems development training 
but with many years of industrial experience. 
Analysis and Design  
Uncertainties were addressed by the project team and customer representatives. The strategy was to collect 
information and increase team capabilities to reach a satisfactory fixed-price contract for staged-delivery. The 
analysis and design task was accomplished by dividing the system into subsystems. Each subsystem was analyzed 
and designed by one or two developers in collaboration with customer representatives. Several initiatives aimed at 
increasing team capability and the customer was generally satisfied with the process and results. 
 
Product standards were defined to support design across subsystems and each working group followed a similar 
process, using object-oriented analysis and design and user-interface prototyping. This analysis was complemented 
with renegotiation of complex requirements. Some requirement issues (#1) were settled by studying how the old 
system was working. Sometimes, users were not certain about rules and simply stated that the solution should 
comply with the old system, or they would explain requirements in terms of what was to be different. The interface 
(#4) was elaborated through prototyping and usability tests. All designs were reviewed both internally and with 
customer representatives and approved by the customer to ensure design conformance (#5). Two developers 
started full time to implement the technical architecture and prepare for programming (#6). The project manager 
implemented processes for project tracking (#15) based on definition of activities and deliverables and adoption of 
earned value analysis. Developer capability (#9) was developed in a number of ways. The project manager 
thoroughly checked and revised all analysis and design documents to compensate for inadequate skills amongst 
team members; separation of concerns was used to isolate complex implementation issues; standards were 
developed to support programming activities; team members were trained in using the programming environment; 
expected requirements changes were over estimated to compensate for unknown programming productivity; also, 
relevant literature and courses continued to be available for the team. Finally, the staged delivery plan was modified 
and detailed (#14). 
 
The developers visited the customer organization to observe work practices (#1). Analysis and design was, 
however, accomplished over the summer where key users at times were inaccessible. Also, the technical platform 
was not yet available for experiments. Purchasing more than a year before the platform was needed was too costly 
and would make the hardware outdated sooner. Despite these limitations, requirements were now well understood 
by developers and having the customer accept design documents reduced conformance uncertainties. The 
implementation strategy was now clear and preparations had been made to support programming. But there were 
still no reliable quantitative data to support estimation. By overestimating requirements changes, the project 
manager attempted to create options for increasing developer capability. Most developers had limited experience 
with fixed-price contracts. They had previously worked with standard software and had no experience with projects 
where requirements, designs, and programs had to be carefully managed, documented, and approved by a 
customer, and where activities were estimated and tracked in detail. 
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Staged Delivery 
Programming, test, and delivery were divided into four stages each delivering part of the system. Uncertainties were 
addressed by the project manager assisted by senior developers in charge of each major subsystem and in close 
collaboration with management, customer representatives, and the steering committee. The strategy was to use 
staged delivery to manage requirements issues and to use stage-wise improvement to gradually improve developer 
capabilities. Each stage followed the same generic process: initial re-planning of stage, detailed design, 
programming and unit test, integration and system test, end-of-stage user test including management of resulting 
changes, and finally an end-of-stage “wrap-up” to decide what to improve in the next stage. When a delivery was 
formally approved by the customer, the related contractual payment was released to SoftConsult. 
 
The adopted implementation strategy (#6) was enacted by relying on experiences from previous projects and by 
assigning a skilled and dedicated person. To help ensure satisfactory system quality (#7), staged delivery provided 
early and continued feedback; expert users prepared test data and took part in designing test cases; and, the expert 
users’ preparation of on-line help revealed weaknesses in design. The project manager continued to collect metrics 
from each stage and to plan stage wrap-ups to improve estimates and processes in subsequent stages. The 
resulting information was used to adjust the development process (#14). Project status (#15) was addressed through 
earned value analysis and definition of activities and deliverables. Developer capability (#9) was improved to some 
extent through ad-hoc initiatives. One full time developer was dedicated to work on subsequent deliverables. Slack 
was increased trough deliberate underestimation of programmer productivity and overestimation of changes. More 
team members were included and the project manager concentrated fully on the implementation effort and a 
dedicated resource was allocated to manage customer relations. 
 
Staged delivery supported customer collaboration and helped manage requirements (#1), especially related to 
functionality and user interface design. It also made it possible to handle changes without serious delays. Changes 
and errors were considered in parallel with development of the next delivery. The cost of general changes and errors 
were reduced because they were found and addressed early. During the first test, 10 percent of the 150 problems 
identified by the users applied to most other modules of the same type—e.g. users wanting the system to accept a 
variety of formats or more help when entering data. Such problems would not have been identified early without 
staged delivery and they would have been more costly to fix after delivery. As a side effect, staged delivery helped 
create more realistic expectations both amongst users and in the project team. Staged delivery was, however, not 
the only way requirements issues were addressed: by having users prepare online help and test-data in parallel with 
development they were forced to consider the design which led to deeper understanding of requirements (#1). 
During programming, developers repeatedly stumbled on requirements issues (#1). These issues were typically 
resolved by informal contacts to expert users.  
 
The project manager’s intention was team capabilities should continually increase through systematic process 
improvement (#10). Informal assessments [McConnell 1998] were conducted during and after the first stage. 
Likewise, attempts were made to extract lessons. But the assessments revealed few insights that the team did not 
know in advance and most discussions were about differences in values among team members concerning what 
constituted professional practices or good quality. The activities were experienced as superficial by most members 
and were, as a consequence, abandoned. The failure to use staged delivery to increase developer capabilities made 
the project manager change his role. He became a coach accepting that developers were quite different, 
emphasizing improvement without providing solutions, and, removing concrete obstacles for individual developers. 
Instead of providing improved processes, the project manager used his time to solve specific problems for 
developers. 
 
Staged delivery required intense coordination with the customer. For example, planning and running the acceptance 
tests amounted to about 800 hours. This compares to an estimated 400–500 hours of post-project-completion 
needed without staged delivery in similar projects within SoftConsult. This, however, came as no surprise; it was 
perceived as a small price to pay to effectively reduce uncertainty. The project manager realized it was difficult to 
practice continuous improvement based on stage wrap-ups. He considered this a failure of the adopted organic 
approach and he was concerned throughout the project that insufficient learning took place. Because of these 
concerns and the indications provided by productivity numbers from the first stages, he ended up adding more 
people to the project than were actually needed. 
Organic Responses 
The adopted organic model helped the project develop a satisfactory product. By releasing deliveries to user-tests, 
feedback was received in the form of error reports, change request, and informal discussions with user 
representatives. These and other responses related to product uncertainties are summarized in the appendix. It is 
difficult to rank the impact of these responses to product uncertainties, but the change requests raised by users 
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Based on this indicator, the responses related to analysis and design had the highest impact on product 
uncertainties, with those related to staged delivery in second place. Moreover, the impact of early releases was, as 
expected, more significant than that of later releases. Early releases lead to identification of general problems that 
were addressed before subsequent releases. Also, uncertainties about how expensive the project would be and how 
much the project would be delayed, made both the customer and project manager reluctant to encourage and 
approve changes. 
In contrast, the organic approach did not effectively address process uncertainties. The systematic attempts at 
process improvement during staged delivery failed and the project manager had to address process uncertainties 
through a number of ad-hoc initiatives. The appendix summarizes the responses to process uncertainties. Again, it 
is difficult to rank individual responses by impact. The project manager’s perception was, however, that the impact of 
dividing the construction into stages and using experience from an end-of-stage wrap-up to systematically improve 
the development process in the next stage was close to zero. 
 
According to the project manager, the two most important responses to process uncertainties were the up-front 
investment in planning and preparing development (e.g. development of standards, templates, tools and plans) and 
the informal and unmanaged learning activities carried out by individual developers as an integral part of doing their 
job. Despite the failure to practice planned and managed improvements, developers in general kept improving their 
performances for about three to four months after they were assigned to the project before productivity stabilized, 
and these changes in productivity were much larger than anticipated. The improvements for most developers’ 
resembled learning curves in the literature [Epple et al. 1991; Lapre et al. 2000]. Some developers increased their 
productivity more than 100 percent during the first months. These were not junior programmers on their first 
assignment, but well-educated programmers with more than five years of experience. These improvements were, 
however, fragile and highly dependent on distribution of responsibilities. Moving a programmer from a subsystem he 
had designed to a subsystem designed by another developer instantly decreased his productivity. The opposite 
effect was seen when developers did two similar tasks in sequence. Then productivity improved in the following task. 
As a consequence, the difference between estimated and actual productivity was reduced from stage-1 to stage-3, 
but then increased again in stage-4 where some radically different tasks were involved, see Table 1. 
 
There were two important reasons that the planned improvement efforts failed. First, one assumption in software 
process improvement is that developers, at some level, use the same processes. Team members had, however, 
different qualifications, preferences, and work styles. They needed different processes, they had particularly strong 
preferences for specific working styles when doing technical work, and their development approach changed over 
time. Even though there were similarities across individuals, the idea of having common processes and improving 
systematically upon them was not feasible. Second, the team members’ commitment to develop an appropriate 
solution and the stressful context with strong focus on deadlines made it difficult to engage them in thorough 
reflections about work practices. Frequent deadlines created a short term out-look in which process issues were 
pushed to the background. Moreover, learning about and improving development processes turned out to be far 
more difficult than learning about customer requirements, and the adopted organic model offered little advice on how 
to do this. 
 
The organic model did not only fail to respond effectively to process uncertainties. It introduced additional ones. 
During staged delivery, a number of issues emerged resulting in increased process uncertainties: 
 
• Sequencing: Which functions should be implemented in which deliveries? Criticality of functionality was 
not the only criterion; the project manager had to consider productivity, coherence, and politics as well. 
• Frequency: How often should the project deliver? There were approximately three months between 
deliveries. That was far from the short cycles recommended in the literature; but it was difficult to reach 
deadlines because there was little room for unexpected events. Whenever a team member was late, 
resources had to be moved to meet the deadline. That had a negative impact on short-term productivity 
because it broke the planned continuity and made it more difficult to exploit task specific knowledge. 
Staffing issues also became complicated. The project was highly vulnerable to team members’ absence 
and it was difficult to integrate new members because the team was busy reaching the next deadline. 
• Rework: What should be redone as a consequence of requirements changes? Changes created a need 
for precise and current information about dependencies between modules and functions. They also 
created a need for information about which tests had to be redone. Customer tests at the end of each 
stage resulted in the identification of 313 errors and a total of 297 change requests representing 
approximately 1,600 hours of work. In practice, this turned two-phase funding into many-phase funding 
and it added significant management overhead to reestimate activities and re-negotiate contractual 
issues. 
• Deadlines: When can we actually deliver? Deadlines were considered contractual events that had to be 
reached on time. Neither the customer nor the supplier wanted to miss a deadline given the media 
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interest in failing projects within the public sector. Always having a relative short time period to the next 
delivery combined with change requests and a great variation in personal productivity placed the project 
team in a permanently stressful situation. 
VII. ANALYSES 
In the following, we analyze the case based on task uncertainty and systems development theory. In response to 
research question 1, we identify insights related to understanding uncertainties at SoftConsult. In response to 
research question 2, we identify insights related to understanding responses to these uncertainties.  
Understanding Uncertainty 
Uncertainty types. Table 2 identifies fifteen different uncertainties categorized as product uncertainties (dealing 
with the client’s problem and its solution) and process uncertainties (dealing with the organization of the project). 
The two key uncertainties, system requirements (#1) and development process (#14), reflects this dual nature of 
task uncertainty in the SoftConsult project. While both types were addressed throughout the project life-cycle they 
were impacted differently by the organic approach. As detailed throughout the uncertainty dynamics narrative earlier, 
two phase funding, staged delivery, and the combination of specifying and prototyping [McConnell 1998] helped 
reduce all major product related uncertainties. The organic approach also provided overall guidance to handle 
process uncertainties, in particular in relation to development strategy (#8) and process improvement (#10). 
However, important process uncertainties, e.g. related to the development process (#14), kept posing serious 
challenges throughout the project. 
 
Interestingly, impacts of organic approaches in the literature are mainly focused on product related issues: number 
of system features [Gordon and Bierman 1995; Boehm and Papaccio 1988], system performance [Gordon and 
Bierman 1995], system quality [Gordon and Bierman 1995; Mahmood 1987], and system maintenance [Gordon and 
Bierman 1995; Naumann and Jenkins 1982]. While some attention is drawn to process issues like effort and user 
participation [Gordon and Bierman 1995], there is little emphasis on emerging process issues. On several key 
issues, for example frequency and sequencing of stages, rework, and management of deadlines, no or insufficient 
advice was provided by the adopted organic model. This lack of emphasis on process uncertainties in the organic 
development literature is inconsistent with the experiences from SoftConsult. 
  
Capability types. We adapted Galbraith’s notion of task uncertainty [1973] to indicate the gap between the 
capabilities required and the current capabilities in a systems development project. While this simple notion of 
uncertainty applied well to the case, further elaborations are needed to explain how project capabilities were 
challenged and developed at SoftConsult. We observed two quite different types of capabilities. First, know-what 
capabilities focused on what the project needed to known or actually knew about requirements, solutions, 
development strategy, and process. Know-what capabilities related to specific areas of knowledge (e.g. a new 
system function); and, they were typically created through analysis, by asking colleagues or customers, by making 
decisions, or through renegotiations with the client. Second, know-how capabilities focused on specific skills or 
experiences required or actually possessed by the project to support problem-solving and collaboration (e.g. to 
program system functions, to test modules, or to interact with users). Know-how capabilities were brought into the 
project through participants’ earlier experiences and they were further developed through training, practicing, and 
collaboration with peers. Know-how capabilities were, however, experienced as quite different and as more difficult 
to develop than know-what capabilities. 
 
The distinction between know-what and know-how capabilities makes sense in relation to the systems development 
literature. A project’s perception of its task [McFarlan 1981] can, for example, be seen as a relation between the 
client’s problem (know-what) and the team’s problem-solving capability (know-how). A project’s experience with 
technology [McFarlan 1981] expresses a relation between general knowledge about applied technologies (know-
what) and the team’s skills and experiences related to these technologies (know-how). Finally, a project’s size and 
complexity [McFarlan 1981] can be seen as a relation between the project’s characteristics (know-what) and the 
project manager’s experience (know-how). However, the literature offers no explication of know-what and know-how 
capabilities or similar distinctions that describe the different aspects of uncertainty experienced at SoftConsult. On 
the contrary, Larman and Basili [2003] argue systems developers need to create know-what capabilities about the 
problem and its solution and iteration is in most cases required to do so. While this is definitely true, there is no 
mentioning of the needs for creating know-how so projects can successfully adopt and leverage organic models. 
Similarly, McConnell’s [1998] two-phase funding and staged delivery approaches are focused on creating the 
necessary know-what capabilities without sufficiently detailing the consequences for know-how management. 
 
Uncertainty dynamics. The project manager at SoftConsult not only had to deal with many uncertainties, but these 
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observed considerable differences in how dynamics impacted the project across product and process uncertainties. 
The key product uncertainty, system requirements (#1), was for example addressed from the very start and 
interacted with most other uncertainties throughout the project life-cycle. All requirements changes were, however, 
treated as adjustments to the initial call for tender, so the overall profile and structure of requirements remained 
stable from the preparing bid phase and onwards. The key process uncertainty, development process (#14), was 
addressed from the second phase and also interacted with most of the other uncertainties. However, the 
development process was influenced by other uncertainties in ways that made it increasingly complex and dynamic 
during staged delivery. As a consequence, the project manager had to focus all his energy on managing internal 
process issues during the delivery stages of the project.  
 
The literature highlights several challenges related to manage uncertainty in systems development (see Section II). 
Some are implications of the adoption of an organic approach (e.g. combining specification and prototyping), some 
are implied by other uncertainties (e.g. the need to renegotiate contracts is implied by changes in requirements), and 
some represent changes in the profile of major uncertainties (e.g. ensuring convergence on the solution). The 
literature offers, however, no account of how uncertainties interact and how uncertainty profiles change over the 
project life-cycle. The implicit, underlying assumption seems to be that uncertainty is the problem and organic 
models the solution. There is little understanding of how the complex and dynamic relationship between 
uncertainties and adoption of specific organic models dramatically influence a project manager’s agenda as it did at 
SoftConsult. 
Understanding Responses 
Response types. We observed a variety of uncertainty responses at SoftConsult. Combining Galbraith’s [1973] two 
generic responses, i.e. offensively developing new capabilities and defensively reducing the need for additional 
capabilities, with uncertainty and capability types, reveals a total of eight different response types. Table 3 shows 
examples of how each of these was adopted at SoftConsult. 
 
Table 3. Response Types 




Systematically evaluating user 
interface prototypes. 







Training users to play active 
role during design and test. 
Training team members in analysis 
and design methodology and 
programming environment. 
 
Know-what  capabilities 
Refusing to guarantee 
changes in related application 
and standard software. 







Adopting three-tier architecture 
known from previous projects. 
 
Separating out high uncertainty 
requirements based on hourly rate. 
 
The project generally adopted a rich variety of responses. Defensive responses normally took the form of a decision 
or a negotiation between stakeholders, they were least time consuming, and they typically focused on ensuring the 
project was completed within schedule. Offensive responses also took a variety of forms, they typically required 
some or considerable investments, and they pushed the project in direction of a more satisfactory product.  
 
Response context. We also observed that uncertainty responses often were shaped by the project context. The 
bidding was, for example, constrained by laws that excluded useful offensive responses. SoftConsult was not 
allowed to take part in the customer’s requirements elicitation, the bid had to be prepared within six weeks, and strict 
procedures had to be followed to secure fair and open competition. The initial context encouraged, in this way, 
adoption of defensive responses even though more offensive ones could have been valuable. When resources, 
time, and possibilities for interaction with customer and users were limited, the project manager responded by 
aligning the task with available know-how within SoftConsult. Later, during staged delivery the project had to commit 
to specific deadlines even though major process issues had not been resolved. That created a context in which the 
options to effectively address product related uncertainties were severely restricted.  
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These findings from SoftConsult suggest uncertainty responses depend on two issues [Keil et al. 1998]. One is the 
project’s understanding of the uncertainty it faces and how these develop over time. The other is the context in 
which the project operates and the degree of control the project can exercise over specific uncertainties. At 
SoftConsult, two events dramatically changed the context. The first was the customer’s choice of SoftConsult by 
which the project acquired the first phase of funding. The second was the agreement about a contract for staged 
delivery by which the project acquired the second phase of funding.  
 
Response modes. Changes in perception of uncertainties as well as in the context for responding to uncertainties 
led to three different response modes over the project life-cycle: competitive mode, risk-hedging mode, and 
collaborative mode, see Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Response Modes 
Mode Competitive Risk-Hedging Collaborative 




Analysis and design 
Staged delivery 
Objective Win contract Reduce risks Meet deadlines 
Integration  Internal External Internal 
Uncertainty  Product Product-Process Process 
Capability  Know-what Know-what Know-how 
Response  Offensive Defensive Offensive 
 
The project initially (01/11/99-06/04/00) operated in competitive response mode with the primary objective to win the 
contract. Due to laws and regulations, there was little integration between the emerging project at SoftConsult and 
the customer, and the project manager put considerable effort into internal networking. Counter to the ideal during 
the early stages of a project [McFarlan 1981], there was little emphasis on external integration. The main focus was 
on internal integration to reduce product uncertainties by offensively generating know-what capabilities about the 
problem and its solution. 
 
After the customer decided to negotiate with SoftConsult (06/04/00-09/10/00), responses changed to risk-hedging 
mode [Lee, 2002]. The primary focus shifted to distributing economic risks between customer and provider and to 
detailing the second-phase contract for staged delivery [Boehm 1988]. The objective for the project was to reduce its 
risks and responses were consequently defensive. There was equal emphasis on developing know-what capabilities 
about the product (detailing system requirements and the technical solution) and the process (developing a plan for 
staged delivery).  
 
Finally, during staged delivery (23/10/00-20/08/01), the project operated in collaborative response mode with primary 
focus on meeting deadlines. The project manager delegated customer relationships to another team member and 
focused entirely on internal integration of the team including close collaboration with expert users. The focus was 
primarily on managing the process by offensively using and cultivating available know-how capabilities. The 
attempts to systematically improve available know-how based on end-of-stage “wrap-ups” failed. Instead, 
developers improved capabilities as an integral part of doing their job. As a consequence, the project delivered the 
system only one month later than scheduled, and with more functionality than anticipated. 
 
The literature suggests that development projects generally should emphasize exploration in early phases to allow 
for feedback from customers and the market, and then increasingly emphasize predictability and control in the later 
stages as uncertainties are resolved [Boehm 1988; Mathiassen and Stage 1992; Chillarege 2002]. In the 
SoftConsult project, early explorations were, however, severely restricted by the context for winning the contract and 
by the focus on distributing risks between the customer and SoftConsult. Also, the construction mode was initiated 
before all product uncertainties were addressed so the contract for staged delivery included severe outstanding 
uncertainties. The project was, therefore, not able to realize the ideals expressed in the literature. Two-phase 
funding [McConnel 1998] is a simplified, pragmatic version of the multi-phase approach of the spiral model [Boehm 
1988], and it represents a huge improvement over one-shot, fixed contracts because it allows for initial reduction of 




Volume 23 Article 27 
severely restricted in the first funding phase and how the second phase was left with challenging uncertainties 
making the fixed, staged delivery contract a somewhat problematic proposition. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The key contribution of this research is the detailed insights it gives into management practices in organic systems 
development. The unlimited access to data from SoftConsult made it possible to provide detailed narratives of 
systems development practices that are rarely seen in the literature. The presentation and interpretation of the case 
were based on analyses of how uncertainties and responses manifested themselves and interacted. To manage 
organic projects effectively, the research suggests to distinguish between product and process related uncertainties, 
between know-what and know-how capabilities, and to emphasize that uncertainties are highly dynamic as projects 
unfold. The research also suggests distinguishing between offensive and defensive responses, to focus on how 
responses depend on context, and to appreciate that different response modes become appropriate as a project 
unfolds. The adopted organic model did help respond to product uncertainties at SoftConsult. At the same time, 
however, the model offered quite limited and in some ways inappropriate help to respond effectively to emerging 
process uncertainties. 
 
Based on Galbraith’s theory [1973], it makes sense to see organic systems development models as alternatives to 
the single-pass and document-driven waterfall model [Royce 1970] that become increasingly appropriate as the task 
uncertainty increases. We adapted Galbraith’s theory to propose the overall distinction between offensive and 
defensive responses. We could also identify specific responses in the case corresponding to creation of slack 
resources (i.e. build slack into schedule and budget) and to creation of lateral relations (i.e. informal contacts and 
discussions between developers and users). However, we didn’t find the other detailed organizational responses in 
Galbraith’s theory particularly useful in distinguishing systems development practices. As a result, we developed a 
uncertainty response framework dedicated to organic development projects (Tables 3 and 4). 
 
While the adaptation of task uncertainty theory [Galbraith 1973; Iivari 1992] helped us make sense of managerial 
practices in the organic project at SoftConsult, our findings are of a preliminary nature and needs to be further 
validated and developed in relation to other organic models and industrial contexts. It is also worth noting other 
important contributions within our field provide complementary views to task uncertainty theory. Feldman and March 
[1981] have for example demonstrated that organizations not only produce information in response to requests and 
as a basis for rational choice and decision-making. Organizations also systematically gather more information than 
they need to serve symbolic purposes. Another complementary view is offered by Ngwenyama and Lee [1997] who 
demonstrate that critical social theory reveal informational behaviours in organizations that are not accounted for 
through traditional theory. It is for these reasons important to engage in complementary research that can help us 
understand the broader cultural and political dimensions of managing uncertainty in organic systems development. 
 
Our findings suggest managers of organic projects need to stay pragmatic and balance the ideals build into organic 
models with the realities enforced by laws, contractual agreements, organizational conditions, and the highly 
complex and dynamic nature of organic projects. Organic development is not a solution to the uncertainty challenge. 
Rather it is a framework for identifying and addressing uncertainties as they emerge and develop over the project 
life-cycle. Organic models help reduce product uncertainties, but they also introduce and reinforce process 
uncertainties requiring complementary management tactics throughout the project.  
 
Managers of organic projects are advised to combine offensive responses in which they seek to increase team 
capabilities with defensive responses in which they seek to reduce the need for additional capabilities. Defensive 
responses are executed through decisions or negotiations with involved stakeholders. Offensive responses are 
executed through staffing, studying, experimentation, experiencing, or improvisation. Our research suggests that 
defensive responses are the least time demanding and typically focus on ensuring that the project is completed 
within schedule. Offensive responses require some or considerable investments and typically push the project in 
direction of more satisfactory results. Finally, managers are advised to differentiate between know-what and know-
how capabilities and to dynamically adapt their response mode to fit the project’s evolving context. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 




Studying public reports 
Analyzing requirements 




2 Technical solution Identifying  alternative 
technical solutions 
Using internal expertise 







  Rejecting uncertain 
change requests 
4 User  
interface 
   
5 Design 
conformance 
   
6 Implementation 
strategy 
   
7 System  
quality 
   
8 Development 
strategy 
Proposing organic approach   
9 Developer 
capability 
Estimating based on similar 
projects 
Selecting project members 
Adopting SoftConsult 




Tactics for process 
improvements 
Adaptive planning and 
management 
  





 Information from informal 
sources 
 
13 Development cost  Counting function points 
Using experience from similar 
projects 
Risk and stakeholder analyses 
Planning with slack 





 Including strategy and process in 
bid 
Committing customer to 
organic approach 
15 Project  
status 
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# Uncertainty Project planning Analysis and design Staged delivery 
1 System 
requirements 
Allocating users to project 
Conducting reviews with 
customer s 
Collaborating with users 
Analysis and design 
Prototyping 
Studying old system 
Observing work practice 
Feedback on increments 
Users preparing on-line 
help and test data 
Addressing uncertain 
requirements 
2 Technical solution    
3 Change 
implications 
   
4 User  
interface 
Agreeing on standard 
interface 
Prototyping and usability tests  
5 Design 
conformance 





 Implement architecture 
Prepare for programming 
Using project experience 
Assigning skilled person 
7 System  
quality 
  Staged delivery 
feedback 
Users preparing on-line 
help and test data 
8 Development 
strategy 
   
9 Developer 
capability 
Forming project team 




Document quality check 
Separation of concerns 
Programming standards 
Training in programming 
environment 
Over estimating requirements 
changes 










11 Competition    
12 Customer 
economy 
   
13 Development cost    
14 Development 
process 
Involving customer in 
detailing of process 
Modifying staged delivery plan Stage-wrap-ups to 
improve process 
15 Project  
status 
 Earned value analysis Earned value analysis. 
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